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Regularizing the Trust Protector 
Paul B. Miller* 
ABSTRACT: Increasingly, settlors of trusts in on-shore jurisdictions are 
making use of trust protectors. Protectors serve a variety of functions but 
generally speaking they are appointed to provide additional security for 
settlors' expectations that trusts will be administered in accordance with their 
intentions. Given the potential breadth and variety of functions performed 
and powers wielded by protectors, their use generates important and profound 
theoretical issues. Taking its cues from recent efforts to regularize trust 
protection, this Article addresses questions concerning the extension of 
fiduciary duties to trust protectors. Amongst other things, it questions the 
tenability of proposals for broad extension of fiduciary status to protectors and 
advocates a structured, fact-based approach to fiduciary characterization of 
trust protection mandates according to which they may be considered fiduciary 
only if and to the extent they implicate fiduciary powers. 
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I. INTRODUCTION
Trust protectors are an orphan of the law, and only slightly less so, of 
legal scholarship. The fiduciary regulation of conventionally structured trusts 
(i.e., those that feature a settlor, trustee(s), and beneficiaries) has drawn 
* Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School. I am very grateful for comments from Tom 
Gallanis, Alexandra Popovici, Rob Sitkoff, and Lionel Smith. I am also appreciative of feedback 
from fellow symposiasts at the Iowa Law Review Wealth Transfer Law in Comparative and International
Perspective Symposium held at the University of Iowa College of Law. Further comments would be 
most welcome at: paul.miller@nd.edu. 
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considerable attention. The peculiarities associated with fiduciary regulation 
of conventionally structured charitable trusts are also given thorough 
treatment. 1 Partly as a result, many trusts scholars hold that fiduciary 
administration lies within the otherwise disputed "core" of the common law 
trust, even as they disagree about particular facets of trust fiduciary 
administration. 2 Equally, and not surprisingly, most general treatments of 
fiduciary law take the trust as conventionally structured as a paradigmatic kind 
of fiduciary arrangement. It is taken for granted that trustees-and no one 
else, for the purposes of trust law-are fiduciaries of trust beneficiaries ( or of 
trust purposes). Likewise, it is taken for granted that the fiduciary regulation 
of trusts ought to be primarily focused on protecting beneficiaries. 
Trust protectors disrupt common assumptions about the fiduciary 
administration of trusts. 3 Protectors are interpolated between trustees and 
beneficiaries (or, in the case of charitable trusts, regulators) in the 
administration of trusts. Generally speaking, protectors provide enhanced 
protection for settlor intent. 4 But, unlike parties to the conventionally 
structured trust, the status of the protector is largely undefined by law. It is 
instead left to the fertile minds of lawyers. Protectors may be granted a variety 
of powers (and, indeed, forms of standing not premised on the possession 
1. See, e.g., Henry Hansmann, The &le of Trust in Nonprofit Enterprise, in THE STUDY OF 
NONPROFIT ENTERPRISE: THEORIES AND APPROACHES 1 15, 1 18-21 (Helmut Anheier & Avner Ben­
Ner eds., 2003) (examining the role and responsibilities of fiduciaries in the charitable trust 
context); Rob Atkinson, Unsettled Standing: Who (Else) Should Enforce the Duties of Charitab1£ 
Fiduciaries?, 23 J. CORP. L. 655, 661 ( 1998); Evelyn Brody, The Limits of Charity Fiduciary Law, 
57 MD. L. REV. 1400, 1418-23 (1998); James J. Fishman, Improving Charitab1£ Accountability, 
62 MD. L.REV. 218, 228-31 (2003); Harvey]. Goldschmid, The Fiduciary Duties of Nonprofit Directors 
and Officers: Paradoxes, Problems, and Proposed Reforms, 23]. CORP. L. 631, 638-49 (1998); Geoffrey 
A. Manne, Agency Costs and the Oversight of Charitab1£ Organizations, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 227,
23 7-40; Jeremy Benjamin, Note, Reinvigorating Nonprofit Directors' Duty of Obedience, 30 CARDOZO 
L. REV. 1677, 1687 (2009). 
2. See Thomas P. Gallanis, The Contribution of Fiduciary Law, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST 
388, 390-94 (Lionel Smith ed., 2013); David Hayton, The Irreducib1£ Core Content of Trusteeship, in 
TRENDS INCONTEMPORARYTRUST LAW 47, 48-52 (AJ. Oakley ed., 1996); Robert H. Sitkoff, Trust 
Law as Fiduciary Governance Plus Asset Partitioning, in THE WORLDS OF THE TRUST, supra, at 428, 
430-34; Daniel Clarry, The Irreducible Core of the Trust 22-24 (August 2011) (unpublished 
LL.M. thesis, McGill University Faculty of Law) (on file with ProQuest Dissertations Publishing).
3. See generally Terence Tan Zhong Wei, The Irreducib1£ Core Content of Modern Trust Law, 
15 TR. & TRUSTEES 477 (2009) (describing the ways in which protectors challenge the 
understanding of trusts). 
4- Lawrence A. Frolik, Trust Protectors: Why They Have Become "The Next Big Thing", 50 REAL
PROP. TR. & EST. LJ. 267, 276-82 (2015); see also John F. Wasik, Guardians of Trusts, N.Y. IlMES 
(Mar. 12, 2014), https:/ /www.nytimes.com/ 2014/03/13/business/retirementspecial/ guardians­
of-trusts.htrnl ("T[he] legacy part of retirement can be unsettling. If you have planned carefully and 
set up trusts and wills, you still might have some nagging doubts about how your wishes will be 
carried out after you are gone. Say you have appointed a trustee you think you can confide in and 
who understands your intentions. What happens if that trustee turns out to be less trustworthy or 
dies, or if estate laws change? Then you might need a third party called a 'trust protector."'). 
REGULARIZING THE TRUST PROTECTOR
and exercise of legal powers),5 some of which are identical in nature to powers
typically devolved on trustees, but others of which are idiosyncratic. The
precise concatenation of powers, or forms of standing granted to a protector,
will depend upon what the lawyer drafting the trust deed aims to accomplish
for the settlor by making provision for a protector. But in many cases, the
protector will enjoy a position of influence over trust administration that will
limit or supersede the authority vested in the trustee, and/or condition the
rights and expectations of beneficiaries. The scope for significant influence
by protectors naturally raises questions about jural and practical relations
between settlors, trustees and beneficiaries. More specifically, it gives reason
to question assumptions about: (1) settlor passivity and the policy against
dead hand control; (2) the unilateral character of authority vested in trustees
over matters of trust administration; and (3) the necessity of clear ex ante
definition of the beneficial entitlements of beneficiaries and/or their
enforcement rights relative to trustees.
Unfortunately, these questions have been neglected. A few academic
papers describe practices in the use of protectors and take stock of associated
legal and practical issues.6 But trusts scholars have largely ignored protectors. 7
This is unfortunate for several reasons.
First, from general theoretical and systemic perspectives, the protector
phenomenon offers important lessons about worthy objects of theoretical
interest in private law. Private-law theorists typically take the law as posited as
static datum for analysis and so neglect underlying forces and processes of
change that drive private law's ongoing evolution. Trust protectors are of
interest because they show how innovation in legal form can be driven not
just in fits and starts by "top down" deliberative development of legal concepts
and categories by lawmakers, but may also derive from practices reflecting
innovation in legal craft led by able lawyers responding creatively to client
needs. Incremental "bottom up" innovation can be quite disruptive,
particularly where accommodation means significant loosening or expansion
of the law's existing modular structures. Again, the protector provides a
compelling illustration: The development is almost entirely to the credit of
5. Frolik, supra note 4, at 273-76.
6. See generaly Alexander A. Bove, Jr., The Case Against the Trust Protector, 37 AM. COLL. TR.
& EST. COUNSEL LJ. 77 (2011 ) (defending the concept of the trust protector and arguing that
legal precedent exists to clarify the protector's role); Frolik, supra note 4 (examining the history
of protectors and relevant statutes and cases regarding their role); Stuart Pryke, Of Protectors and
Enforcers, 16 TR. & TRUSTEES 64 (2010) (comparing the role of protectors to that of enforcers, a
role found largely in offshore trusts); Rebecca Puni, Exploring the Many Identities- of the Protector,
19 TR. & TRUSTEES 9o8 (2o13) (discussing the role of protectors through agency, contract, and
equity principles).
7. Exceptions include Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theoy of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL
L. REV. 621, 67o-71 (2004); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Trust Protectors, Agency Costs, and Fiducia
Duty, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2761, 2761-63 (2006) (examining fiduciary duties of trust protectors,
and the costs and benefits created by protectors).
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trust lawyers aiming to make trusts more responsive to settlor intent.
Lawmakers have had to play catch-up, and they have done so inconsistently
and with mixed success.8
Second, from the perspective of trust law and theory, recourse to
protectors raises intriguing questions about the doctrinal "core" of the trust
and its relational matrices.9 It is assumed that fiduciary administration by
trustees is a core feature of the common law trust, and likewise that the
relational matrices within it are defined by law, according to type of trust, as a
matter of public interest. Trust protectors call these assumptions into
question; fixed matrices give way to fluid ones, unsettling common
assumptions about elements of the doctrinal core of the trust that are
responsive to its usual relational characteristics. The trustee enjoys
presumptive authority and responsibility for trust administration, but the
extent of their authority and responsibility may be conditioned by soft or hard
constraints visited upon them via the protector. Beneficiaries (or, for
charitable trusts, regulators) ordinarily enjoy exclusive standing to bring
enforcement actions against trustees in connection with trust administration,
but the interpolation of a protector may mean that standing to enforce the
trust is shared with a protector who will act in the interest of the settlor, even
where this might be inconsistent with the interests of beneficiaries.
Third and finally, from a fiduciary law perspective, protectors provide an
instructive lesson in the limitations of dominant approaches to the
identification of fiduciary relationships. Are protectors fiduciaries, and if so,
for whom? These are, of course, very basic questions, but they are
surprisingly-and, again, I think instructively-difficult to answer. Wide
variation in the constitution of mandates of protectorship bedevils the use of
relationship identification methods that assume constancy in the constitution
of kinds of fiduciary mandate. Furthermore, given that protectors are usually
engaged to enhance protection for settlors' expectations, protectors raise
difficult questions about the proper objects of trust fiduciary duties. More
specifically, though the standard assumption is that fiduciary duties are owed
to the mandate's beneficiary, it may also be (more generally, and in the
context of mandates of protectorship) proper to think of grantors as obligees.
Additionally, to the extent that trust protection occurs within an existing
framework of fiduciary administration, it raises interesting questions
concerning joint fiduciary administration by fiduciaries occupying different,
but coordinate, fiduciary roles. Under what circumstances will coordination
support fixed joint or joint-and-several liability rules, fixed or presumptive
8. Andrew T. Huber, Trust Protectors: The Role Continues to Evolve, PROB. & PROP. MAG.,
Jan.-Feb. 2017, at 28, 33 ("The use of trust protectors in modern domestic trust planning has
outpaced the body of law governing the role. There is little case law dealing specifically with trust
protectors, and state statutes are often inconsistent or confusing.").
9. For an introduction to this debate, see supra note 2.
[VOI. 103:20972100
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burden-shifting liability rules, and/or discretionaryjudicial apportionment of
liability?
It should already be apparent that protectors deserve more notice than
they have received. This symposium is an opportune moment for an essay on
protectors that raises basic theoretical questions informed by comparative
perspectives. The protector exemplifies increasingly international pressures
for, and processes of, change in trust law and practice. Offshore jurisdictions
popularized the practice of employing protectors and the practice has since
become increasingly prevalent onshore.-o Along with the protector's growing
popularity has come interest in different jurisdictions in clarifying the
protector's legal status and obligations.-1 Furthermore, in the United States,
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
("NCCUSL") has spearheaded the first comprehensive effort at regularization
of protectors through its recently finalized Uniform Directed Trust Act
("UDTA").12 The UDTA is an interesting and auspicious development in
itself, but for present purposes is also valuable to the extent that it informs
analysis of different strategies available for clarifying the protector's legal
status and obligations.13
It would be impossible in this Article to productively address each of the
questions just identified. I therefore restrict my attention to those that bear
on the fiduciary status and obligations of the protector. These questions
figure prominently in the modest literature on protectors and have proven
divisive. 14 Some argue that protectors are invariably fiduciaries, while others
claim that they are only contingently fiduciary. As I will explain, this
divergence of opinion in part reflects the peculiarities (and, in many cases,
the limitations) of different methods of identifying fiduciary relationships.
The analysis unfolds as follows. Part II explains why questions concerning
the fiduciary status and obligations of protectors have proven difficult, noting
lO. See Frolik, supra note 4, at 270-7 1 ; Puni, supra note 6, at yo.
11. See generally ALEXANDERA. BOVE,JR., TRUST PROTECTORS: A MANUAL WITH PRACTICE FORMS
(2014) (detailing developments on trust protectors in U.S. law); MARK HUBBARD, PROTECTORS OF
TRUSTS (2013) (detailing developments in English law); Grahame Young, Trust Protectors An
Australian Perspective, 22 TR. & TRUSTEES 455 (2o16) (discussing the role of protectors in Australian
law). On New Zealand law, see LAW COMM'N, REVIEW OF THE LAWOF TRUSTS: ATRUSTSACT FORNEW
ZEALAND 156-6o (2013) (discussing"[c]ustodian and advisory trustees"). "Advisory trustees" perform
strictly advisory functions and are therefore not proper analogues of protectors. The Law Commission
did take note of protectors, but rather than focus on comprehensive regularization, it focused on
judicial powers of removal. See LAW COMM'N, THE DUTIES, OFFICEAND POWERS OFA TRUSTEE: REVIEW
OF THE LAW OF TRUSTS FOURTH ISSUES PAPER 61 (2011).
12. UNIF. DIRECTED TR. ACT (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
13. For another perspective on the UDTA, see generally Alexander A. Bove, Jr., Trust
Protectors in the United States. A Step Behind the Rest of the World, 22 TR. & TRUSTEES 737 (2016)
(lamenting the lack of clarity and consistency regarding protectors in U.S. law).
14. See id. at 738 ("Perhaps the most significant issue among US attorneys with respect to
the use of protectors is their strong and active debate over whether the protector is or should be
regarded as a fiduciary.").
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in particular the effect of wide variation in settlors' rationales for appointing
protectors, the functions performed by protectors, and the powers conferred
upon them. Part III canvasses and comments critically upon different
strategies that have been deployed in addressing the fiduciary status and
obligations of protectors. Part IV develops an alternative approach to the
fiduciary status and obligations of protectors; one that allows for
differentiation of fiduciary from non-fiduciary functions, and advocates for
recognition of enforcement rights for settlors and their proxies.
II. THE PROBLEM: THE (ALMOST) INFINITE VARIABILITY OF TRUST
PROTECTION
Several scholars have noted prevailing uncertainty about the legal status
and duties of trust protectors.15 Indeed, the drafters of the UDTA observe in
the Prefatory Note to the Act that:
There is much uncertainty in existing law about the fiduciary status
of a nontrustee that has a power over a trust and about the fiduciary
duty of a trustee, sometimes called an "administrative trustee" or
"directed trustee," with regard to actions taken or directed by the
nontrustee. Existing uniform trusts and estates acts address the issue
inadequately. Existing nonuniform state laws are in disarray.1
6
These observations are strong but not overstated. However, a diagnosis
often tells little of the underlying pathology. Why, exactly, is there lack of
clarity on the legal status and obligations of protectors? One could point to
some seemingly obvious factors. One is that protectors have only recently
come into wide use in onshore jurisdictions. 17 Another is that, as is typical of
practice-driven innovation, we are in the midst of a period of some delay and
uncertainty as lawmakers struggle to analyze and accommodate pressures for
change.
That said, we may lack clarity simply because it is genuinely difficult to
make sound generalizations about salient features of trust protection. That is,
it is difficult to say, as a general matter, whether trust protection i volves the
undertaking and performance of a fiduciary mandate, and if so, when, why,
and to what extent. There are other problems: Suppose protectors are
sometimes fiduciaries: For whom do they serve as fiduciaries? Additionally,
recognizing that protectors usually occupy a fiduciary position coordinate
with that of a trustee, how should new liability rules imposed on protectors
affect the default arrangement of liability rules imposed on trustees?
15. See, e.g., Richard C. Ausness, When is a TrustProtectoraFiduciary, 27 QUINNIPIAC PROB.
L.J. 277, 277 (2014); Bove, supra note 13, at 738; PhilipJ. Ruce, The Trusee and the Trust Protector:
A Question ofFiduciay Power. Should a Trust ProtectorBe Held to a Fiduciaty Standard?, 59 DRAKE L.
REV. 67, 69 (2010); Sterk, supra note 7, at 2763.
16. UNIF. DIRECTED TR. ACT, Prefatory Note.
17. Sterk, supra note 7, at 2764.
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I have said that protectors are a hard case for fiduciary law because
relevant generalizations are hard to sustain.,s I shall explain what I mean in a
moment. For now though, it may be noted that there is one important
generalization that can be made of protectors: namely, that the core function
of the protector is that of promoting respect for the settlor's intentions in the
administration of a trust.19 To this extent, the role of the protector is
continuous with other mechanisms (doctrinal and institutional) by which
trust law aims to give effect to settlor intent. 20
In my view, the protector's role in ensuring respect for settlor intent
explains the high degree of variation seen in specification of mandates of trust
protection.2 - It is hard to sustain pertinent generalizations about protectors
precisely because different settlors and counsel will have different intentions
for protectors and will accordingly devolve a mixed and highly variable set of
rights, powers, and permissions upon them. As a result, the basic role for the
protector-securing implementation of settlor intent-is realized through a
plurality of functions and mandate-types. While from a policy perspective, this
variability might seem to be a "bug" of practice-driven innovation, from a
private ordering perspective it is surely a "feature." Functional and jural
flexibility in trust protection enables trust lawyers to achieve different things
for different settlors, depending on their specific needs and concerns.22
If flexibility is a point of functional excellence of trust protection, its
appeal is seen in the range of reasons for which a well-advised settlor might
appoint a protector. If the settlor's overarching concern is with the
implementation of her intentions, there are any number of reasons that might
ground worry about the abidance of her intentions over time, and accordingly
justify the appointment of a protector with a mandate responsive to those
reasons. For instance, the settlor might have reason to question (if not
necessarily to doubt) the trustworthiness of her trustees.2 3 The settlor may
instead, or also, have reason to question her beneficiaries' capacity or
18. Professor Alexander has also made this observation. See Gregory S. Alexander, Trust
Protectors: Who Will Watch the Watchmen, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 2807, 2811 (2006) ("[O]ne size
won't fit all, which is one of the reasons why it will be so difficult for courts to figure out just what
the fiduciary rules should be with respect to trust protectors.").
1g. This is a point of general consensus but has been articulated most convincingly and
fulsomely by Sterk, who describes the protector as "a person whose primary function is to exercise
judgment on behalf of the trust settlor." Sterk, supra note 7, at 2767.
20. See Sitkoff, supra note 7, at 661-62. This normative orientation of trust law has been
articulated best in the work of Robert Sitkoff. See id.; Robert H. Sitkoff, Trusts and Estates:
Implementing Freedom of Disposition, 58 ST. Louis U. LJ. 643, 658-6o (2014); see also ROBERT H.
SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS, AND ESTATES 2-32 (ioth ed. 2017) (discussing
"freedom of disposition" in American law).
21. See Alexander, supra note 18, at 2811.
22. Ausness, supra note 15, at 282-83.
23. For examples, seeJayAdkisson, Opinion, Trust Protectors-What TheyAreand Why Probably Evey
Trust Should Have One, FORBES (Aug. 25, 2012, 1:o3 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/jayadkisson/
2012 o 25/ trust-protectors-what-they-are-and-why-probaby-every-trust-should-have-one.
2018] 210 3
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motivation to effectively monitor the trustee and to take enforcement action
as needed on bases that would resonate with the settlor given her intentions
(which may, or may not, be aligned with the particular interests of particular
beneficiaries). 24 The settlor may anticipate that changes bearing on the
relative desert of her beneficiaries might justify adjustment of beneficial
entitlements or the exercise of dispositive discretions, but worry that the
trustee may not respond appropriately. 25 Additionally, or alternatively-and
particularly for long-term or perpetual trusts-the settlor may worry about the
impact of changes in law, policy, or socio-economic context on the realization
of her intentions, and doubt the wisdom of leaving it to his or her trustees
and/or the courts to respond to same.26 Finally, the settlor might be generally
skeptical about the court's capacity or willingness to effectively and efficiently
protect her interest in sound administration of the trust (e.g., to detect and
act on cause for removal of a trustee).27 Put simply, a settlor may have any
number of reasons to distrust or to be wary of placing exclusive trust in
trustees, beneficiaries, and/or the courts when settling property on trust;2
for any one or a number of these reasons, she might appoint a protector as
additional security for her expectation of implementation of her intentions.
The variety in typical reasons for appointment of a protector is reflected
in variability in their functions and in the juridical constitution of their
mandates (i.e., in the kinds of rights, powers, and privileges granted to
protectors). This is, in turn, key to understanding why questions about the
fiduciary status and obligations of protectors are so difficult. While others
have noted that the functions and powers of protectors vary, 29 there has been
little effort to provide synthesis. Thus, I shall now very briefly offer typologies
of the functions and powers granted to protectors.
As to functions: I have observed that all protectors are responsible for
protection of settlor intent. The particular functions to a protector performs
may include constitutive functions, advisory functions, supervisory functions, and
managerial functions. First, a protector will serve a constitutive function where
called upon to make decisions about ways in which the trust is constituted (or
reconstituted), including decisions regarding choice of jurisdiction,
amendment of the terms of the trust, and termination of the trust. Second, a
24. Ruce, supra note 15, at 71; see Young, supra note ii, at 456 ("To alleviate the obvious
problems a person, aptly named the Protector, was appointed to protect the interests of the
intended true beneficiaries.").
25. Ruce, supra note 15, at 70.
26. Id. at 69-70.
27. Ausness, supra note 15, at 283.
28. As also noted by Thomas Gallanis. See Thomas P. Gallanis, The New Direction ofAmerican
TrustLaw, 97 IOWA L. REV. 215, 218 n.15 (2011).
29. Variation in protectors' powers, in particular, has been widely noted. See Frolik, supra
note 4, at 273-76; Pryke, supra note 6, at 65; Puni, supra note 6, at 9o9; Ruce, supra note 15,
at 73-75-
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protector will perform an advisory function where called upon to give non-
binding advice to trustees and/or beneficiaries in connection with ongoing
administration of the trust. Third, a protector will serve a supervisory function
where required to keep abreast of trust administration, to monitor and
evaluate trustee performance and/or the condition of trust property, to
monitor and evaluate beneficiaries' claims for distributions, and to give or
withhold consent to decisions provisionally made by trustees. Finally, a
protector will perform a managerial function when granted responsibility for
making binding discretionary decisions (i.e., first-order managerial decisions,
as opposed to second-order supervisory decisions) on matters of ongoing trust
administration, whether alone or in consultation with the trustee.
As for powers3o: The particular kinds of power conferred upon protectors
include powers of appointment, powers of resettlement, supervisory and enforcement
powers, advisory powers, veto powers, and powers of direction. First, protectors may
be granted powers of appointment. These include the conventional trust power
of appointing beneficiaries, but in this extended conception, may also include
the power to appoint other constituents of the trust, including trustees and
successor protectors. Second, protectors may be granted powers of resettlement.
These powers allow the protector to effectively resettle the trust by altering
one of more of its basic terms, including by decanting or variation of its situs.
Third, protectors may be granted supervisory and enforcement powers, including
powers to monitor the performance of trustees and behavior of beneficiaries,
to compel information pertinent to trust administration from the trustee, to
attach conditions upon the use made of distributions by beneficiaries, and to
take enforcement action against trustees or third parties. Fourth, protectors
may be granted advisory powers, which typically include the power to issue non-
binding advisory opinions to trustees in respect to trust administration. Fifth,
protectors may be given veto powers, which give them indirect and partial
control over the administration of the trust through the power to provide or
withhold consent to decisions made by the trustee. Sixth and finally,
protectors may be granted powers of direction, which enable them to make first-
order decisions about the administration of the trust, either directly or
indirectly through provisions of binding directions to the trustee.
As noted earlier, the wide variation in the types of functions performed
by, and powers granted to, protectors are pertinent because it makes it
genuinely difficult to answer questions concerning protectors' fiduciary status
and obligations. Amongst he issues, three are especially important: first, how
to reliably determine the fiduciary or non-fiduciary nature of mandates of
trust protection; second, how to define the content and directionality of
protectors' fiduciary obligations; and third, how to determine the balance of
liability appropriate to coordinate fiduciary administration of trusts by
30. Here, broadly construed as including rights and privileges, as well as legal powers properly
so-called. See supra note 29 (pointing to the variety seen in powers devolved on protectors).
2018] 2105
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protectors and trustees. As I explain in Part III below, several prominent
approaches to the identification of fiduciary relationships assume relative
constancy in the constitution of fiduciary relationships. This assumption is
simply not viable for protectors.
III. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS, AND THEIR LIMITATIONS
Trust protectors have attracted limited scholarly commentary and little
more legislative or judicial notice. That said, recent analyses highlight
questions about the protector's fiduciary status and obligations and suggest
different approaches to resolving tem.31 Three are particularly noteworthy.
Under the first, direct status-based approach, it is argued that protectors occupy
a categorically fiduciary role or position, one that (by virtue of its generality)
encompasses all functions performed and powers exercised by them. This
methodology is direct in that status is premised on direct characterization of
the role and responsibilities of protectors or the essential and/or typical
juridical constitution of mandates of trust protection. Under the second,
analogical status-based approach, it is again said that protectors occupy a
categorically fiduciary role or position on the basis that their role or position
(in general, or in virtue of specific functions performed or powers held) is
akin to that of a trustee. If a trustee is a fiduciary as a matter of status, so too
should be the protector, for the protector exercises control over the trust in
a form or manner similar to that of a trustee. This approach is analogical rather
than direct as it relies on the power of analogy between the positions of trustee
and protector in supporting status-based fiduciary characterization of trust
protection. A third and final approach calls for a fact-based analysis of trust
protection; unlike the two status-based approaches, its use implies rejection
of the supposition that protectors can be deemed fiduciaries as a general
matter. The fact-based analysis calls for case-by-case assessment on the basis of
some stipulated criteria that support fact-based demarcation of fiduciary and
non-fiduciary mandates. In the example considered here-developed by
Mattew Conaglen and Elizabet Weaver-te criterion of differentiation is
that of the reasonable expectations of the settlor in appointing the
protector.32
As noted, one response to uncertainty over the fiduciary nature of trust
protection has been to claim that protectors are a fiduciary as a matter of
status. Status-based reasoning is common in fiduciary law.33 It should
therefore not be surprising that some have suggested that status should be
extended to protectors, impliedly on a direct basis. This is, for example, the
31. In addition to the works discussed below, see supra note 15.
32. Matthew Conaglen & Elizabeth Weaver, Protectors as Fiduciaries: Theoy and Practice,
18 TR. & TRUSTEES 17, 29 (2012).
33. See Paul B. Miller, The Idea of Status in Fiduciary Law, in CONTRACT, STATUS, AND
FIDUCARY LAW 25, 25 (Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold eds., 1st ed. 2016).
21o6 [VOI. 103:2097
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approach adopted in several offshore jurisdictions.34 It is also the approach 
favored by legislators in several U.S. states.3s As Ausness has explained, 
legislation in these states treats "a trust protector [as a] fiduciary for all 
purposes."36 Similarly, the Uniform Trust Code establishes a presumption that 
persons "who [enjoy] a power to direct" the trustee's decisions are 
fiduciaries.37 This provision has been interpreted as applying to all protectors 
without further analysis of the technical meaning "of a 'power to direct'" or 
the prevalence of same in mandates of trust protection.38 Broad claims of 
fiduciary status are also advanced in the literature. Ruce, for example, argues 
that "[a] trust protector is, and should be, treated as a fiduciary and should 
be held to the same fiduciary standard as a trustee."39 
While this approach is familiar, it does not provide satisfactory resolution 
of any of the three key issues flagged at the end of Part II. First, it does not 
evince a principled basis for fiduciary characterization of trust protection. It 
consists of a mere assertion of fiduciary status. There is thus no basis for 
evaluating it. Reasons for doubt about the assertion of status are multiplied 
when one considers the scope for wide variation in protectors' functions and 
powers, as outlined in Part II. Second, it does not give us any basis upon which 
to determine (a) the proper objects (i.e., ends or purposes) of mandates of 
trust protection; and, relatedly (b) the directionality of fiduciary duties. 
Whom or what are trust protectors engaged to protect? To whom are, or 
should, their duties be owed? Difficult questions, in any case, but nearly 
impossible to answer without a more reflexive method for characterization of 
the protector's legal position. Third, and finally, because this approach 
involves nothing other than a claim of fiduciary status for protectors, it has 
nothing to say, in itself, about how the fiduciary status of a protector impacts 
the conventional fiduciary structure of the trust. More specifically, it provides 
no basis for determining whether, and if so when, imposition of fiduciary 
duties on protectors might justify apportionment of liability between 
protectors and trustees, or the erosion or elimination of liability for trustees. 
To these objections, an expected retort might be that the underlying 
problems go to execution, not methodology as such. Status-based reasoning 
may sometimes be clumsily applied to protectors, but it could be applied with 
34. See, e.g., Belize Trusts Act 1992, ch. 202 § 16(5) (revised ed. 2011); Nevis International 
Exempt Trust Ordinance, 1994 § 9 (amended 1995) (St. Kitts & Nevis); Rawcliffe v. Steele, 
1993-95 MLR 426, 513 (High Ct. of Justice, Isle of Man 1995). 
35. See Sterk, supra note 7, at 2769 (commenting on legislative provisions in state law of
Idaho, Tennessee, South Dakota and Wyoming); see also 760 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/16.3(e) (2016) 
(all three statutes defining trust protectors as fiduciaries); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 
§ 700.7809(1) (a)-(b) (West 2012) (same); N.H. REV. STAT.ANN.§ 564-B:12-1202 (2008) (same).
36. Ausness, supra note 15, at 293.
37. UNIF. TRUST CODE§ 8o8(d) (UNIF. LAWCOMM'N 2010).
38. Sterk, supra note 7, at 2770.
39. Ruce, supra note 15, at 69.
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greater nuance and accordingly have greater plausibility. If there is to be
anything to this reply, it must be supported by analysis that renders explicit
plausible grounds for the extension of fiduciary status to protectors. Happily,
an excellent example is found in the UDTA. The UDTA deftly addresses the
question of the fiduciary character of trust protection, and it also offers clear
statements on the content and directionality of protectors' duties, and the
impact of the latter on conventional fiduciary liability rules.
I have said that the UDTA addresses each of the three key issues about
trust protectors noted earlier. The most important of these is the question
whether and if so, when and why, protectors should be deemed fiduciaries.
The UDTA endorses a status-based approach to this issue but does so on an
indirect analogical basis. The statute declares all protectors fiduciaries on the
basis that they exercise the powers of trustees or powers akin to those of
trustees.4 The extension of status to protectors is thus justified on the basis
of resemblance between the legal incidents of their role and that of the
trustee.
The UDTA relies upon analogical reasoning to address protectors'
duties. As the UDTA drafters note, "existing statutes tend to say only that a
trust director is a 'fiduciary,' without specifying which kind of fiduciary or
which fiduciary duties apply."41 They rightly recognize this as problematic.
The UDTA drafters reason that, to the extent that protectors' powers are akin
or identical to those of trustees, it is only reasonable to hold protectors to
trustees' fiduciary duties.42 Thus, the UDTA subjects protectors to "the same
fiduciary duty and liability in the exercise or nonexercise of [a] power ... as
a sole trustee in a like position and under similar circumstances" where "the
power is held individually," and "as a cotrustee in a like position and under
similar circumstances" where "the power is held jointly with [the] trustee or
another" protector.43 The Prefatory Note explains that "[t]he logic behind
these rules is that in a directed trust the trust directorfunctions much like a trustee in
an undirected trust. Accordingly, the trust director should have the same duties as a
trustee in the exercise or nonexercise of the director's power of direction. . .. ."44
Finally, the UDTA recognizes that the question of the appropriate
balance of liability is complex and fact-dependent. More specifically, it
recognizes that in approaching the question one must be mindful that:
(a) the appointment of a protector will result in a variable division of power
between protector and trustee (with the precise allocation to be specified by
the settlor in the trust deed); (b) the division of power will often entail
40. UNIF. DIRECTED TR. ACT § 8 & cmt. (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017); see also id. Prefatory Note
('[T]he [UDTA] imposes a mandatory minimum of fiduciary duty on ... trust [protectors] in
accordance with the traditional principle that a trust is a fiduciary relationship.").
41. Id. § 8 cmt.
42. Id.§8(a)(1).
43. Id. (emphasis added).
44. Id. Prefatory Note (emphasis added).
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allocation of powers to protectors that would otherwise lie with trustees; and
(c) that, in either event, trustees will often be subject to (i.e., liable to comply
with) protectors' powers. Recognizing these complexities, the UDTA provides
for diminishment or exclusion of trustees' fiduciary duties where the
protector's discretion is controlling. Thus, the Act requires the trustee to
"take reasonable action to comply with" decisions of the protector and
absolves the trustee of liability for associated acts, save where compliance
would entail willful misconduct.45
The UDTA offers appealing solutions and notjust because they are clear
and principled. The choice of methodology reflected in the Act-analogical
status-based reasoning-is attractive for several reasons. First, analogical
reasoning is familiar in that it is widely relied upon in fiduciary law more
broadly.46 Second, there is reason to think that analogical reasoning is
particularly apt here, as protectors are often granted powers ordinarily
reserved for trustees.47 Third, legislated fiduciary norms are almost always
ascribed on the basis of status, which might suggest that status-based
methodology is particularly suitable for use in legislation. Fourth, the
analogical variant on the status-based method enabled the drafters of the
UDTA to avoid the cost and complexity of devising a status-based framework
specifically for protectors. And finally, the overall scheme of the UDTA reveals
a decided preference for parsimony, which in turn affords clear rule of law
and efficiency advantages.
Special attention should be paid to drafting strategies which enable the
UDTA to overcome limitations often associated with analogical status-based
reasoning in fiduciary law (notably: inflexibility as a result of reliance on
status, and distortion as a result of reliance on analogy). Cumulatively, these
strategies enable significant tailoring of fiduciary norms. The UDTA provides
for tailoring in the following ways: first, it provides for the principled
exclusion of non-fiduciary powers, carefully itemizing powers which are not
to be considered fiduciary;4 second, it enables settlors to waive the fiduciary
duties that would otherwise apply to a protector in the exercise of a power, to
45- Id. § 9 (a).
46. Indeed, it found a champion in the distinguished English private law scholar,
Peter Birks:
The truth is that 'fiduciary' is one of those words which means what it does, and what
it does is to form a bridge from the express trust to other analogous situations....
The word is thus the vehicle for the extension of incidents of the express trust to
trust-like situations. A fiduciary relationship is a relationship analogous to that
between express trustee and beneficiary, and a fiduciary obligation is a trustee-like
obligation exported by analogy.
Peter Birks, The Content ofFiduciay Obligation, 34 ISR. L. REV. 3, 8 (2000).
47. For cautionary arguments against this strategy, see generally Conaglen & Weaver, supra
note 32; Sterk, supra note 7. See alsoAlexander, supra note 18, at 2811 (emphasizing the difficulty
in transplanting fiduciary standards to trust protectors).
48. UNIF. DIRECTED TR. ACT § 5.
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the extent waiver would be permitted for similarly situated trustees under
state law;49 and third, the Act permits settlors to impose additional duties or
liabilities on protectors or trustees by express stipulation.5 Put simply, the
UDTA allows for significant flexibility in the application of fiduciary duties to
protectors by allowing settlors to ratchet fiduciary duties up or down.51
The methodology the UDTA employs is sensible. It allows for significant
fact-sensitive tailoring of fiduciary norms for protectors. However, in my view
it is not sufficiently flexible and fact-sensitive. There are three concerns. First,
an attribution of fiduciary status being encompassing, the Act does not allow
for the possibility of non-fiduciary mandates of trust protection or substantive
demarcation52 of fiduciary from non-fiduciary powers (other than nominate
categories of excluded powers). Second, the Act does not contemplate that
the content and directionality of protectors' duties ought to be variable, with
variations determined by the specific constitution of protectors' mandates,
rather than by analogical extension of trustees' duties. The UDTA does
repeatedly caution of the need for context-sensitive and "flexible" application
of trustees' duties to protectors, but it remains to be seen whether judges will
heed the call for caution.53 Third, apportionment of liability between
protectors and trustees is handled by way of ex ante rules which, by their
nature, are incapable of working finer adjustment of the balance of liability
between protectors and trustees in light of material contingencies in trust
deeds and trust administration (i.e., ex ante allocation of power by the settlor
and ex post mandate performance by protectors and trustees).
In my view, the scope and scale of variation in the functions performed
and powers vested in protectors suggest that one would do better with a
method that enables differentiation of fiduciary from non-fiduciary mandates
49. See id. § 8 (a) (2) (" [T] he terms of the trust may vary the director's duty or liability to the
same extent the terms of the trust could vary the duty or liability of a trustee in a like position
and under similar circumstances.").
50. Id. §§ 8(c), 9(c).
51. Additionally, the UDTA specifically provides for calibration of fiduciary duties in cases
where protectors' powers are administered jointly with trustees (calibration for shared liability)
and where protectors' powers are latent or "springing" in the sense of being vested conditionally
(calibration for conditional liability). Id. §§ 8 cmt., 9 cmt.
52. That is, demarcation on the basis of the legal or juridical nature of the power as
distinguished from differentiation on the mere basis of party characterization.
53. UNIF. DIRECTED TR. ACT § 8 cmt. ("In applying the law of trustee fiduciary duties to a
trust director, a court must make use of the flexibility built into fiduciary law. . . . Fiduciary
principles are ... amenable to application in a context-specific manner that is sensitive to the
particular circumstances and structure of each directed trust."). The blackletter of section 8
emphasizes the need for contextual judgment as well, inasmuch as protectors are made subject
to duties that would apply to trustees "in a like position and under similar circumstances." Id. §
8(a) (1) (B). But the explicit instruction to account for context in this way will be useful only to
the extent that a protectors' power (and/or broader mandate and circumstances in which the
power is to be exercised) has an analogue in the trustee.
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based on their particular constitution. This approach favors structured fact-
based analysis as a methodology of choice.
Supposing that the better approach will be fact-based, there remains the
question of how it ought to be specified. As is true of status-based methods,
fact-based approaches are commonplace in fiduciary law,54 but they are also
notoriously unruly. They falter, conceptually and practically, where criteria
for the identification of fiduciary relationships are contested or prove
inadequate to the challenge of enabling reliable sorting of fiduciary from non-
fiduciary relationships.55 The strength of fact-based analysis is thus a function
of stipulated criteria for identifying fiduciary relationships. Do the criteria
direct attention to material typical or essential properties of fiduciary
relationships? If posited criteria are not actually criteria at all (e.g., if they are
mere placeholders for criteria, or worse, for questions about criteria), or if
they are poorly selected (e.g., if they include immaterial or inessential
characteristics of fiduciary relationships), one will suffer for relying on a fact-
based approach.
The potential upside and downside risks of fact-based methodology can
be appreciated by reflecting on a framework for protectors proposed by
Conaglen and Weaver. Conaglen and Weaver begin by noting, astutely, that
analysis here "becomes complicated because of the range of powers and
positions that a protector can hold."56 They defend adoption of a fact-based
approach on this basis, noting:
The breadth of the range of powers to which the 'protector' label
can be applied means that the question whether a protector is, or is
not, a fiduciary must be approached on a case-by-case basis, rather
than on a global basis by reference to some supposed (but actually
non-existent) category of 'protectors'. It is ... unwise in the extreme
to make sweeping statements about protectors .... 57
Conaglen and Weaver are right to say that protectors are not amenable
to status-based analysis because the category-"protector"-cannot readily be
typified. Fact-based analysis helpfully directs attention to the actual incidents
of a particular relationship and the question whether they include
distinguishing properties of fiduciary relationships. This being the case, there
are two further important methodological questions: First, what incidents or
properties ought one to examine? Second, how is one to determine whether
a particular incident or property of a relationship is distinctively fiduciary?
54. See Paul B. Miller, The Fiduciary Relationship, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
FIDUCIARY LAw 63, 65-69 (Andrew S. Gold & Paul B. Miller eds., 2014).
55- Both problems have frustrated the development of fact-based fiduciaryjurisprudence in
Canada, for example. See Paul B. Miller, A Theoy of Fiduciay Liability, 56 MCGILL L.J. 235,
243-52 (2011).
56. Conaglen &Weaver, supra note 32, at 17.
57. Id. at 20.
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Conaglen and Weaver have an answer for the first question but equivocate on
the second. As we shall see, the equivocation proves fatal to the viability of
their account.
Conaglen and Weaver reasonably suggest that fact-based analysis ought
to be focused on the powers conferred on protectors by settlors: "The
question [of the fiduciary character of protectors] must be approached in a
more confined way, by asking whether a particular power held by a particular
protector is-or is not-held in a fiduciary capacity."5s However, they do not
identify criteria capable of supporting differentiation of fiduciary and non-
fiduciary powers. Instead, consistent with Conaglen's other work, the authors
advocate a nice-sounding but analytically empty "reasonable expectations"
framework of analysis.59 Under this approach, popularized by Paul Finn, a
relationship (or, here, a power) is to be identified as fiduciary or otherwise on
the basis of the reasonable expectations of the parties.6 If the parties'
transaction6l was such as to generate an expectation, reasonably held, that the
protector would hold and exercise a power on a fiduciary basis, so the power
should be deemed. If otherwise, the power will be considered vested and held
on a personal basis. As Conaglen and Weaver put it:
The general thrust of the inquiry can ... be stated thus: if we are
trying to decide whether trust protectors are, or are not, fiduciaries,
the initial focus of our attention should be on the question whether
it is legitimate to expect that the protector would act in the interests
of someone else to the exclusion of his or her own several interests.
62
While Conaglen and Weaver helpfully follow up by showing that courts
tend to focus on differentiating kinds of power when determining whether or
not a protector is a fiduciary,63 to further suggest that this inquiry is, or could
be, conducted on the basis of reasonable expectations analysis is not
illuminating. One could say that any exercise in determining the allocation of
legal entitlements or burdens is premised on reasonable expectations analysis
because the concept of a reasonable expectation is itself conclusory. A court
58. Id.
59. See id. at 18.
6o. P.D. Finn, The Fiducian, Prinip, in EQUITY, FIDUCIARIESAND TRUSTS 1, 54 (T.G. Youdan
ed., 1989); see alsoJames Edelman, When Do Fiducia Duties Arise?, 126 LAWQ. REV. 302, 317-18
(2010) ("Canadian, English and Australian courts, following the lead of [Paul] Finn, have all
been moving to coalesce . .. factors into a test based upon the 'reasonable' or 'legitimate'
expectations of the principal. . . . [R]easonable expectations' are part of the process of
determining, by implication or expression, the nature of the fiduciary duties which have been
undertaken .. " (footnotes omitted)).
61. Conaglen and Weaver focus on the expectations of the settlor, but the logic of
reasonable expectations analysis would seem to require that one focus on evidence material to
the expectations of all parties, including the protector and trustee.
62. Conaglen & Weaver, supra note 32, at 18.
63. Id. at 24-35.
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deems an expectation reasonable or unreasonable at the end of analysis, after
having soundly applied some legal criteria of reasonableness. Thus, to say that in
sorting fiduciary from non-fiduciary powers the courts have reached
conclusions about whether an expectation held was reasonable is really to say
nothing at all, for the construction placed on the power is dispositive of the
question whether the expectation was reasonably held. Put otherwise: To ask
whether a fiduciary expectation in respect of a power is reasonably held is
simply to restate the question whether the power is fiduciary or not.
If this were all that might be said for fact-based analysis, one might think
it not very promising at all. As allied to a reasonable expectations framework,
the fact-based approach cannot resolve any of the three key issues that we have
considered thus far. Given that it does not supply any positive criteria by which
one might distinguish fiduciary from non-fiduciary powers, it cannot assist us
in differentiating fiduciary from non-fiduciary mandates of trust protection.
It has nothing to say on the calibration of protectors' fiduciary duties, whether
as to content or directionality. And it likewise has nothing to say about the
appropriate balance of liability as between trustees and protectors.
Fortunately, there is more to be said for fact-based analysis. In the section
to follow, I explain how fact-based analysis oriented by the Fiduciary Powers
Theory of fiduciary relationships enables principled demarcation of fiduciary
from non-fiduciary mandates of trust protection and provides resources with
which to productively address questions concerning the calibration of
protectors' duties and balancing of liability as between protector and trustee.
IV. AN ALTERNATIVE
I have suggested that a structured fact-based analysis is preferable in this
context to status-based analysis, given the inconstancy of protectors' mandates
and the hazards of assimilating protectors and trustees. But I have also
cautioned that the soundness of fact-based analysis depends on how
governing criteria are stipulated. In what follows I develop a variant on the
structured fact-based approach that relies on a theory of fiduciary
relationships (the Fiduciary Powers Theory, or "FPT") that I have developed
elsewhere.64 I will first explain the methodological implications of the FPT
and its claims about the nature of fiduciary relationships and will then show
how it can be profitably applied to protectors.
As to methodology: The FPT suggests that all fiduciary relationships
share certain essential formal properties. Reference to the formal properties
of fiduciary relationship is practically significant-for adjudication and for
social practices that depend on clear demarcation of various forms of legal
64. Miller, supra note 54, at 
6
9-9o; see also generally Paul B. Miller, JustiyingFiducia Duties,
58 MCGILL L.J. 969 (2013) (discussing the justifications for fiduciary duties); Paul B. Miller,




relationship-to the extent that it permits principled and predictable
identification of fiduciary relationships. The FPT offers a constructive
interpretation of existing methods of identifying fiduciary relationships and,
equally importantly, patterns in the development of fiduciary law resulting
from legislative and judicial deployment of these methods. More specifically,
the FPT shows how status-based identification of fiduciary relationships can
be coherent and justifiable in spite of risks of over-generalization.65 It also
explains why most existing status-based categories of fiduciary relationships
merit fiduciary status given their typical constitution. Equally, the FPT shows
how fact-based identification of fiduciary relationships can operate in a
coherent and predictable way, at or beyond the margins of status, by guiding
fact-based construction of particular relationships. 66 A further
methodological advantage of the FPT is that it shows how status- and fact-
based analysis can be understood as mutually consistent.67 Status-based
analysis is appropriately relied upon to the extent that the formal properties
of fiduciary relationships are genuinely typical of a category of relationship to
which a designation of status is attached. Fact-based analysis is appropriate
where these generalizations cannot safely be made, or where there is reason
to question their validity in a given case.
Second, as to the nature of fiduciary relationships: The FPT claims that
all fiduciary relationships are founded on mandates under which a fiduciary
is granted discretionary powers for other-regarding purposes. Ordinarily,
these purposes engage specific practical interests of an identified beneficiary
or set of beneficiaries.6 However, they may instead be in the nature of abstract
institutional or public-oriented purposes, something that is commonplace, for
example, in the fiduciary administration of private organizations and
governmental or quasi-governmental bodies.69 In any case, under the FPT,
the critical formal properties of a fiduciary relationship are those of power,
discretion, and an other-regarding purpose. 7°
The centerpiece of the FPT is its recognition that fiduciary relationships
feature mandates under which a fiduciary is granted fiduciary powers. It is
through the exercise of fiduciary powers that a fiduciary performs his
mandate. Fiduciary powers are legal powers derived from, and so traceable to,
the person (i.e., the legal personality) of the grantor(s) of the mandate under
which the fiduciary acts. As a kind of legal power held under mandate,
fiduciary powers enable the fiduciary to alter the legal position of those for
65. See Miller, supra note 54, at 49-50.
66. Id. at 48.
67. Id. at 46.
68. See Finn, supra note 6o, at 1-3; Edelman, supra note 6o, at 304-05.
69. See generally Paul B. Miller & Andrew S. Gold, Fiduciary Governance, 57 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 513 (2015) (analyzing governance mandates in fiduciary relationships).
70. The notion of mandate is also essential under the FPT, but it goes to relationship
formation and execution rather than to constitution.
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whom he acts. The exercise of fiduciary powers accordingly implicates the
fiduciary in the formation and alteration of jural relationships on behalf of
those he represents. For example, he may exercise his power to acquire a
right, discharge a duty, or grant a license or permission. He may also exercise
a right, occasion a liability, or make binding decisions about the future
enforcement of rights or assertion of claims to remedies. These are but a few
illustrative examples.
An implication of the FPT is that the fiduciary, serving in a representative
capacity under his mandate,71 acts on an independent basis for others in its
discharge. This implies that all fiduciaries have latitude for judgment in the
exercise of their powers. The caveat that powers must be discretionary to be
considered fiduciary encapsulates this point. A person who acts as a mere
proxy for another may be accountable for acts in fraud of the powers
conferred upon him, but he is not a fiduciary.
Another important implication of the FPT is that the fiduciary enjoys and
exercises his powers subject to the other-regarding purposes for which they were
granted. The other-regarding quality of a power is critical to differentiation
of the bases on which powers can be held and exercised by or for a legal
person. If a power is held without stipulation as to an other-regarding
purpose, or in circumstances in which same cannot be implied in law, it is
presumed to be held in a personal capacity and so is treated as a kind of legal
entitlement of which its bearer can make personal use, as he sees fit. If a power
is instead granted expressly or impliedly for an other-regarding purpose it will
be deemed held by way of mandate and so must be exercised in a fiduciary
capacity for those purposes. Ordinarily, other-regarding purposes will be
expressly stipulated by the grantor of the mandate under which the fiduciary
acts (e.g., by a legislative body, in the case of mandates arising by legislation,
or by private persons, in the case of mandates arising by way of personal grant
of power). However, where a grant is silent as to its purpose, a court may imply
a restricted set of other-regarding purposes based on its construction of the
grantor's intentions.
The Fiduciary Powers Theory provides a sound analytical structure for
fact-based identification of fiduciary relationships. The theory suggests that,
when engaged in fact-based analysis, courts ought to proceed by addressing
the following questions in a stepwise way: (1) Has the would-be fiduciary been
granted legal powers?; (2) Are the powers discretionary?; and (3) Have thepowers been
granted, expressly or impliedly, for an other-regarding purpose ? When a court answers
each of these three questions affirmatively, it is compelled to conclude that
the relationship in question is fiduciary. If instead it reaches a negative finding
71. On the representative nature of fiduciary mandates, see Paul B. Miller, Fiducia}




on any of the three questions, it ought to conclude that the relationship is not
fiduciary.
The structure above is one of general application, meaning that it should
be applied to protectors just as it would be otherwise. Following the stepwise
analysis, a court should first consider the threshold question whether a
protector has been granted powers, properly so-called, by the settlor.
Supposing that he has, the court must then consider (1) whether those
powers are discretionary, and (2) whether they have been granted for an
other-regarding purpose. Again, if, but only if, the court finds in the
affirmative on each of these points should the protector be deemed a
fiduciary. Other questions of construction will then arise in relation to
calibration of the protector's duties and the balance of fiduciary liability to be
borne by the protector and trustee respectively.
We may now turn our attention to the relative utility of the different
approaches we have considered in addressing our three key issues: capacity
for effective differentiation of fiduciary from non-fiduciary mandates,
calibration of fiduciary duties, and balancing of fiduciary liability between
protectors and trustees.
First, the FPT-structured fact-based approach offers advantages over the
alternatives in facilitating principled and predictable differentiation of
fiduciary from non-fiduciary mandates. Status-based approaches-while
defensible in other contexts-are inapt here because they are premised on
untenable generalizations. In some cases-perhaps many cases-protectors
are granted fiduciary powers. However, in other cases they are not. Status-
based approaches ignore this variegation.72 Fact-based approaches are, by
design, sensitive to it. That said, it must be emphasized that the viability of
fact-based analysis is a function of the quality of posited criteria for identifying
fiduciary relationships. The FPT-structured variant provides a robust set of
criteria, permitting courts to make meaningful distinctions between trust
protection mandates and between elements of a given mandate. It preserves
flexibility as a functional virtue of trust protection but ensures that fiduciary
duties will be applied as and to the extent appropriate.
Second, the FPT-structured fact-based approach also informs the
calibration of fiduciary duties for trust protectors in away that the alternatives
do not. The direct status-based approach has nothing to say about the
fiduciary duties of protectors, a point emphasized by the UDTA drafters. The
indirect or analogical status-based approach is informative but operates on
the questionable basis that fiduciary duties, like fiduciary status, can in general
be safely transposed-with contextual adjustment-from trustees to
protectors. By contrast, the alternative developed here suggests that courts
72. The UDTA provides for the exclusion of some non-fiduciary powers, but the exclusions
are not especially broad, nor are they based on a general distinction between fiduciary and non-
fiduciary powers. UNIF. DIRECTED TR. ACT § 5 (UNIF. LAW COMM'N 2017).
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ought to calibrate the content and directionality of fiduciary duties to suit the
characteristics of particular mandates. More specifically, it suggests that the
courts ought, in calibrating duties, to be very attentive to the nature of, and
balance between, powers conferred on protectors and trustees respectively
under a given trust deed. If, for example, a protector is granted a discretionary
power that, in its ordinary exercise, entails a subordinate administrative role
relative to the trustee, it may be appropriate to apply a duty of good faith to
the protector rather than the more robust loyalty obligations that apply to the
trustee. On the other hand, if the discretionary powers of the protector are so
broad as to exclude powers in the trustee, or if in the exercise of same the
protector is clearly in an ascendant administrative position, the protector
ought to be subject to robust standards of loyalty and care. Finally, FPT-
structured analysis takes us in a novel direction on the directionality of
fiduciary duties. The UDTA suggests that the directionality of duties for
protectors should track that of state law on the duties of trustees-i.e., the
duties should be always and only be owed to beneficiaries. 73 By contrast, under
the FPT, directionality is a function of the construction placed on the
purposes attached to a protector's mandate. If a mandate, or particular subset
of powers, is explicitly or implicitly conferred for the benefit of beneficiaries,
the usual assumptions about directionality are sound. But where a mandate
or set of powers is instead conferred primarily to secure the settlor's
expectations, it may be appropriate to treat the settlor as the obligee.
Finally, the alternative approach advocated for here provides a basis for
more finely crafted decisions on the balance of liability between protectors
and trustees. Direct status-based approaches do not provide any insight in
circumstances like this, where fiduciary status is claimed for different
categories of actor, each of whom is conjointly involved in fiduciary
administration. The analogical approach employed in the UDTA addresses
the issue of balance of liability but with the limitation adverted to earlier. The
Act presupposes divisions of power between trustee and protector that are
amenable to fixed rules assigning full liability to the protector, trustee, or both
simultaneously. 74 In my view, rather than be settled by fixed ex ante rules, the
balance of liability should instead be determined judicially ex post, through a
context-sensitive assessment of the relationship between the powers of the
trustee and protector respectively as they bear on a particular matter of trust
administration. To what extent did each enjoy significant discretion in the
exercise of the power(s) in question? A framework permitting discretionary
apportionment of liability would allow the courts to determine, based on their
construction of the trust deed and analysis of evidence relating to actual
practices of trust administration, whether and if so to what extent, a protector
or trustee should bear the greater burden of fiduciary liability.
73. See id. § 8.




Trust protectors warrant more attention than they have received. They
are an instructive example of practice-driven innovation in legal form, and as
is characteristic of this kind of innovation, lawmakers are struggling to catch
up. Inattention isjust one factor. Another is the complexity of the innovation;
trust protection practices significantly impact the conventional structure of
the trust and conventional trust administration. Various jurisdictions now
recognize protectors, and there is some evidence of interest in thorough
regularization. The challenges facing lawmakers are significant and go well
beyond the scope of this Article, however, amongst the most significant
challenges facing lawmakers is that of clarifying whether, and if so, under what
circumstances a protector will be a fiduciary, and to whom will he owe
fiduciary duties. Existing authority on this point is limited and gives no
indication of emerging consensus. While the lack of consensus may reflect
systemic lag in the law's accommodation of practice-driven innovation, I have
suggested that it might also reflect the fact that there are genuinely deep and
difficult problems associated with development of an apt framework of
fiduciary norms for protectors. Protectors perform different functions and
enjoy different kinds of powers in different kinds of trust. The challenge for
lawmakers is therefore one of devising a framework of fiduciary norms that is
appropriately responsive to the mutability of trust protection. Having
examined alternatives, I argue that a fact-based approach, structured in light
of the Fiduciary Powers Theory (FPT) of fiduciary relationships, offers a
suitable framework for analysis of protectors. Unlike the alternatives, the FPT
enables fiduciary regulation of protectors in a manner sensitive to material
contingencies, permitting one to regularize the fiduciary functions of the
protector in a way that preserves the prized functional flexibility of trust
protection.
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